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PUEBLO INDIAN AUXILIARIES IN NEW MEXICO
1763-1821
By Oakah L. Jones, Jr. *
throughout the colonial period of Latin American
S
history, experienced difficulties in her relations with numerous, widely-divergent groups of American Indians. The
PAIN,

Spanish Crown and the Council of the Indies legislat,ed to
protect these aborigines, but distance, local conditions and
time often interfered to the detriment of the Indians as the
colonists frequently ignored, violated or circumvented the
laws emanating from the mother country.
The authorities in Spain established the theoretical basis
for Indian policy. Protection of the Indians remained the
primary aspect of that doctrine, although a period of vacillation and uncertainty existed until the passage of the New
Laws in 1542. Legislation on behalf of the Indians embraced
many minute but important policies, such as prohibiting the
sale or giving to them of arms 1 and opposition to their travel• Captain, Department of History, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado.
AGN-Archivo General y Publico da la Nacion, Mexico, D.F. (in all cases the photostats available in the Coronado Library at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque,
were consulted); AGI-Archivo General de las Indias, Sevilla, Spain (photostats and
microfilm in the Coronado Library consulted) ; NMA-New Mexico Archives (originals
available in New Mexico Records Center, Santa Fe, and photostats consulted in Coronado
Library; document numbers according to Ralph E. Twitchell, The Spanish Archi"es 0/
New Mexico, 2 vols., Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1914).
1. Recopilaci6n de /eyes de los reynos de las [ndias (3 vola.; Madrid: Impresora de
dicha real y supreme, 1943). Tomo II. Libro vi, Titulo i, Ley xxiv. Hereinafter cited as
Recopilaci6n.
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ling by or even mounting horses. 2 Although these laws were
clearly worded, they were often difficult to enforce. Otherwise, it would not have been necessary to re-publish six
times, for example, the law denying arms to the Indians. 3
After the early conquests of the highlY-developed sedentary peoples, such as the Aztecs, Quechuas, Mayas and Chibchas, the Spaniards were confronted by the most difficult
problem they were to face in colonial administration-how to
reduce and control the innumerable warlike tribes? Since
these groups were essentially decentralized, nomadic and
dependent upon mobility and plunder for their existence, it
was very difficult for an outside force to govern them.
Spain tried many techniques to resolve this central problem, but she was never completely successful. Perhaps the
two most common characteristics of her policy for three
centuries were the attempts to reduce the Indians to settled
communities (poblaciones) 4 and her use of vast numbers of
friendly Indians as auxiliary forces to augment her inadequatearmy.
In New Spain both of these policies appeared during the
conquest of Mexico by Hernan Cortes from 1519 to 1522.
Large numbers of Tlascalans served faithfully in the conquistador's army, and thereafter were employed in the Spanish northward expansion, particularly in Texas and Coahuila,
as exemplary citizens or auxiliaries. They were rewarded for
their services with honors, favors and privileges such as exemptions from taxation, grants of land and outright gifts of
equipment, seed and building materials. 5
The practice of using Indian auxiliaries was expanded
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Usually only a few tribes could be counted upon as loyal allies
2. Ibid.• Tomo II, Libro vi, Titulo i, Ley xxxiii.
3. Ibid., Tomo II, Libro vi, Titulo i, Ley xxxi.
4. Poblaciones were usually small unchartered communities with an alcalde in charge.
They should not be confused with three other terms: Pueblos de Indios were Indian towns
in existence before the conquest; congregaciones were Indian towns established after the
conquest: and reducciones were generally mission towns. Thus, in New Mexico, Acoma
would be a Pueblo de Indios, Laguna a congregaci6n, and the missions near Jemez would be
reducciones, but all three could be considered as poblaciones.
5. Recopilaci6n, Torno II, Libra vi, Titulo i, Leyes xxxix through xlv.
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in a given area during the early days of Spanish occupation,
but gradually the number would be increased to incorporate
as many as possible against a common foe.
Thus, in New Mexico the Pueblo Indians were the allies
of the Spaniards, although they had to be reconquered and
subjugated by the Spanish military forces after the Pueblo
Revolt of 1680. Mexican Indian auxiliaries, who had accompanied the expedition of Juan de Onate when he occupied
New Mexico in 1598, did not return to the region after the
reconquest by Diego de Vargas from 1693 to 1696. 6 To replace
them the Spaniards gradually began using Pueblo Indians
to augment their small military forces in campaigns against
the indios Mrbaros. Contingents from all of the Rio Grande
and the western pueblos contributed to the success of Spanish armies under Vargas and the governors during the last
century of Spanish occupation.
All of the existing pueblos shared in the common obligation to serve with the military forces in campaigns for the
defense of the province of New Mexico. Encomenderos frequently commanded the militia and auxiliary forces during
early military actions,7 but were replaced later by experienced officers, usually assigned from the Presidio of Santa Fe.
By the middle of the eighteenth century Pueblo Indians
were organized into their own units commanded by a capitan mayor de la guerra, 8 who was subordinate to the appointed Spanish commander (usually a lieutenant from Santa
Fe). Father Manuel de San Juan Nepomuceno Trigo indi6. Fray Francisco Atanasio Dominguez, The Missions of New Me",ico, 1776, Eleanor
B. Adams and Fray Angelico Chavez. translators (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1956), 304.
7. The military obligation of the encomenderos has been touched upon in France V.
Scholes, "Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW,
XII, No.4 (October, 1937), 389. In addition, Dr. Scholes has adequately covered the deep
imprint of Christianity which the Spaniards transmitted to the Pueblos during the seventeenth century. See his Church and State in New Mexico, 1610-1650 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1937). This is Volume III in the Historical Society of New
Mexico's Publications in History. The conversion served as a good foundation upon which
to build the Spanish-Pueblo alliance of the next century.
8. Charles W. Hackett (ed.), Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva
V izcaya and Approaches Thereto. to 1779 (3 vols. ; Washington: The Carnegie Institution,
1923-1937), III, 366. Hereinafter cited as Hackett, Historical Documents.
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cated in his letter of 23 July 1754 that the "mission Indians"
were brave and warlike, particularly those of Pecos whom he
admired for their continued resistance to the barbaric tribes,
and hestated that these Indians went out "voluntarily" on
campaigns against their nomadic enemies. 9 By this time the
entire province was having difficulty defending itself from
the raids and encroachments of warlike tribes who had been
receiving firearms from French traders. An inventory of
Spanish defensive forces in New Mexico revealed this problem as early as 1752. The entire province contained just 6,453
persons, with only 2,174 capable of bearing arms. To meet
the increasing threat to the region they were equipped with
4,060 horses, 60,045 arrows, 414 lances, only 57 swords and
151 leather jackets;IO
By 1763 New Mexico, which included present day Arizona and had eastern and western boundaries at the Rio
Grande and Rio Colorado, had become an isolated frontier
community. During the next thirteen years the entire northern frontier of New Spain became a violent, unsettled theater
of war, and Spain's hold upon New Mexico became uncertain.
Gradually the province was encircled with warlike tribes so
that by 1776 the few Spanish settlers and their loyal Pueblo
Indian allies were confronted with the Navahos to the northwest, Utes in the mountains of the north and northwest,
Comanches to the north and east, and various bands of
Apaches to the south, east and west.n
Spanish military forces and defenses were inadequate to
combat these threats. Against the raids of the indios barbaros
who sought cattle, horses and provisions principally, the settlers and Christian Indians could defend themselves with
only a few antiquated and ineffective weapons. Pueblos employed the bow and arrow, or occasionally the lance, but by
9. Letter in Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 465•
• 10. General and Particular State of the Number of Families and Persons Which the
Twenty-two Reduced Pueblos of Indians of the Kingdom of New Mexico Possess, AGN.
Provincias Internas 102, Expediente 3, fl, Ano de 1752.
11. Alfred B. Thomas, Teodoro de Croi", and the Northern Frontier of New Spain,
1776-1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941), 7. Hereinafter cited as Thomas,
Teodoro de Croi",.
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1772 only 250 persons, in addition to the presidial troops,
possessed firearms in the province, and these were outdated
shotguns.I 2 The Presidio of Santa Fe could not contribute
much assistance for it had been considered incapable of defense as early as 1766 when it was composed of only eighty
soldiers at an annual cost of 34,070 pesos. IS
Spain made numerous efforts to resolve her problems on
the northern frontier. Unfortunately, her increasingly precarious global position at the end of the eighteenth century
and her increased size after reacquiring Louisiana from
France in 1762-1763 prevented her from deploying large
numbers of well-disciplined, experienced military forces to
northern New Spain and particularly to New Mexico. The
mobility of the indios bcirbaros with their acquisition of large
numbers of horses and their possession of more modern fire~
arms jeopardized Spain's hold on that remote province. New
presidios were established, others were relocated, inspections
such as that of the Marques de Rubi were conducted, lengthy
reports were submitted, continuous Spanish and Indian cam~
paigns resulting in the loss of many horses and supplies were
carried out without individual compensation,14 and various
recommendations were entertained from all sources.
Yet, the results were always the same. Hugo O'Conor reported that the total losses in the regions beyond Chihuahua
had been four thousand persons and over twelve million
pesos between 17.48 and 1772.15 Even the great visitador-general Jose de G6,zvez was frustrated during his visit of 17651771 in his efforts to subdue the Indian disturbances in the
North and pacify the frontier. 16
12. Frank D. Reeve, "Navaho·Spanish Diplomacy. 1770·1790," NEW MEXICO HISTORI·
CAL REVIEW, XXXV. No. S (July, 1960),211.
13. Lawrence Kinnaird. The Frontiers of New Spain: Nicolas de La Fora's Description,
1766·1768 (Berkeley: The Quivira Society, 1958), 91.
14. An Account of the Lamentable Happenings in New Mexico and of Losses Experienced Daily in Affairs Spiritual and Temporal Written by Father Fray Sanz de Lezaun in
the Year 1760, in Hackett, Historical Documents. III, 472.
15. Alfred B. Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers: A Study of the Spanish Indian Policl/
of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico, 1777-1787 (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1932), 5. Hereinafter cited as Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers.
16. Herbert I. Priestley, Jose de Galvez: Visitor General of New Spain (1765-1771)
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1916),268.
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In New Mexico, Governor Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta
made a conscientious effort to overcome the critical state of
affairs during his term from 1767 to 1778. In the first year of
his governorship he established a special post of fifty presidials and Indian auxiliaries on a hill near Ojo Caliente to
watch closely the ford on the Rio Grande which the Comanches were using to invade the frontier. In the same year
he led a combined force of 546 presidials, militia and Indian
allies on an extensive campaign. Each year thereafter he
conducted sizeable expeditions which employed numerous
Indian auxiliaries, largely from the pueblos, to combat Utes,
Navahos, Apaches and Comanches, depending upon which
presented the greatest threatP
The Viceroy of New Spain reported that 140 inhabitants
had been killed, seven thousand horses and mules had been
stolen and whole herds of cattle and sheep had been destroyed
in the northern provinces during 177U 8 By November, 1772,
Governor Mendinueta faced a critical situation. Apache raids
had become widespread, reaching Zuni, Tubac andSonora. 19
Recommendations for resolving the Indian problem were
received from all sources. Bishop Tamaron, who had been
alarmed by the ineffective defense against hostile Indians
during his visitation of New Mexico in 1760, had recommended the greater use of infantry. Horses attracted the
enemy and furthermore the cost of infantry was much less
than that of cavalry. He also proposed annual campaigns to
combat the warring tribes and suggested that they be carried out annually for a period of two or three years. 20
Hugo O'Conor, who inspected the region for the King in
1775-1776, found the colonists to have a fine military spirit
and creditable valor in the defense of the area. He recom17. Alfred B. Thom~, The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751-1778 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1940), Volume XI of the Coronado Cuarto Centennial
Publications, 1540-1940, George P. Hammond (ed.), 39-45.
18. Bucareli to Ariaga, No. 193, Mexico, 27 January 1772, AGI, Guadalajara 512, in
Thomas, Forgotten Frontier8, 6.
19. Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers, 8.
20. Eleanor B. Adams (ed.), Bishop Tamaron's Visitation of New Mexico, 1760 (Albuquerque: Historical Society of New Mexico, 1954), Volume XV of Publications in History,
88-91.
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mended the formation of ten frontier detachments, two of
which were to be in New Mexico. These two groups would
be composed of vecinos (settlers) and Indios amigos (friendly
Indians) to defend the frontier, primarily against the Comanche menace, but against other tribes as well. O'Conor
reported that the friendly Indians were those of the Pueblos,
particularly from Jemez, Zia, Santa Ana, Sandia, Isleta, Laguna, Acoma, and others "I don't know." He emphasized that
they were peaceful people, dedicated to agriculture and the
growth of livestock,21
The detachments proposed by O'Conor for New Mexico
would total 565 men. 22 He suggested that a body of one hundred troops be added to the following levies, establishing a
grand force of 2,228 men for the general campaign in the
North. The levies for New Mexico were :23
Pueblos

Spaniards

J emez
Zia
_................................................................
Santa Ana
_................................................
Vicinity of Bernalillo
Sandia
Town of Albuquerque
Atrisco and Pajarito
Isleta
_
_........................
Vicinity of Valencia and Tome _......................
Vicinity of Belen and Pueblo of genizaros
Laguna and Acoma
TOTALS

Indians

0
0
0
15
0
80
25
0
30
40
0

40
100

190

375

40
50
80

o
25

o
o
40

o

21. Enrique Gonzalez Flor~s and Francisco R. Almada, Informe de Hugo O'Conor sobre
el estado de las Provincias Intemas del Norte, 1771·1776 (Mexico: Editorial Cultura, 1952),
106·107.
22. Plan of Operations, Hugo 0'Con6r, Carrizal, 24 March 1776, AGN Provincias Internas 87, Document 5. Thomas, in his Forgotten Frontiers on page 10, states that the
number was 595, but no basis for this total can be ascertained.
23. Ibid. For purposes of clarity, simplicity and easy comprehension I have always
rendered the names of the pueblos and other places as they are currently spelled. 0'Con6r's
speIling of Zia is Silla, Jemez is spelled with an "s" at the end and his Alhuquerque can·
tains the old 14 r" before the first "q." Spanish proper names were variously used by different
authors. Thus, we find Santa Fee, Nabajoo, Belem, Santa Anna, etc.
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Governor Mendinueta closely observed the problems of
defense in his province. Unique among his proposals was the
suggestion that the Spaniards, who were widely-dispersed
along. the Rio Grande, be collected into centrally-located,
easily-defended, fortified towns, resembling those of the
Pueblo Indians. He cited their lack of unity and desired that
the Spaniards emulate the "Pueblos de Indios" for defense
against the Comanches, Apaches, Utes and Navahos. 24 Here
was a reversal of the normal policy for Spain, since it was
usually her intention to reduce the Indians to easily-controlled towns 25 which resembled those of the Spaniards.
Mendinueta desired to augment his small presidial force
of eighty troops with settlers and "indios cristianos" (Christian Indians, undoubtedly Pueblos) .26 He admonished the settlers for their reluctance to respond to his orders and pointed
out that all should do so no matter what time or under what
conditions the orders for campaigns arrived. Each should
take his horse, lance, pike, or whatever type of arms he possessed to answer the call since every settler had an obligation to perform a minimum of eighteen days of public work
annually.27
The cacique of each pueblo was instructed to maintain
constantly in readiness a force of fifteen or twenty Indians.
He was to supply them with the necessary provisions for
campaigns so that they could depart immediately when directed by the governor. Once the summons had been received,
the cacique would collect his force and personally conduct it
in pursuit of the enemy, while other Indians of the pueblo
rounded up the horses and brought them to the campaign
element. By this technique the enemy could be prevented
24. Mendinueta to Viceroy Antonio Bucareli, Santa Fe, 26 March 1772. Facsimile from
Biblioteca Nacional de Mexico, Leg-ajo 10, Part 1. Another copy has been published in
Alfred B. Thomas, "Governor Mendinueta's Proposals for the Defense of New Mexico,
1772-1778," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW. VI, No.1 (January. 1931), 27-30.
25. Recopilaci6n, Tomo II, Libro vi, Titulo iii. Ley i.
26. Mendinueta to Bucareli. Santa Fe, 26 March 1772, Biblioteca Nacional de Mexico,
Legaio 10. Part 1.
27. Bando of Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta, Santa Fe, 16 November 1771, NMA, Document 663.
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from escaping unpunished from his raids upon settled
communities.28
General campaigns proposed by Governor Mendinueta involved the problem of maintaining sufficient numbers of
horses. Since the indios Mrbaros had no fixed location and
could ride wherever they pleased, the pursuing force had to
do likewise. To do so adequately each man involved in the
campaign required at least three or four horses. 29 Other problems of the expeditions were lack of compensation for the
settlers and Indians, inadequate offensive arms since the
friendly Indians possessed only bows and arrows (although
the governor noted that a few had firearms), and the problem of distance which rendered it almost impossible to use
Indians from Zuni, Acoma and Laguna in campaigns against
the Comanches as these three pueblos were occupied in defending themselves against the Apaches. 30
Annual campaigns were attempted during Mendinueta's
term of office, but they seldom yielded notable results, although the pursuing force sometimes marched hundreds of
miles. Expeditions in 1774, for example, were made from
Albuquerque, Keres and Laguna against the newly-aroused
Navahos. These consisted largely of Pueblo auxiliaries, supplemented by militiamen and some presidials from Santa
Fe. 31
Occasionally, control of the Indian auxiliaries was apparently relaxed for F'ray Dominguez noted that the Christian Indians removed the scalps of the heathen ones "before
they are quite dead" and danced with them as a token of
victory and to avenge the grievances they had suffered. 32 Be28. The Form of Government Used at the Missions of San Diego de los Jemez and
San Agustin de la Isleta by Father Fray Joaquin de Jesus Ruiz, Their Former Minister.
[Undated, but presumably in 17731, in Hackett, Hi8t<J'l"kal Documents, III, 506. Note that
by this time the Pueblos were apparently being permitted to utilize horses for both peaceful and warlike purposes.
29. Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, 26 March 1772, Biblioteea Nacional de Mexico,
Legajo 10, Part 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Reeve, "Navaho-Spanish Diplomacy, 1770-1790," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW,
XXXV, No.3 (July, 1960). 207. Although the Spaniards usually rendered the linguistic
term Keres as Queres, the more well-known version will be utilized in this study.
32. Dominguez, Missions of New Merico, 257.
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fore the departure of these expeditions Mass was said for all
the participants and a brief sermon was delivered on the
constitution of and the means for conducting a "just war." 33
By 1776 defense reached a critical point. The hostile Indian invasions of New Mexico were among the most serious
on the entire northern frontier. 34 To meet these threats Spanish Indian policy by this date basically included two prin~
ciples: the first was preventive, consisting of peace treaties
with the Indians which met with little success because of the
independence of one band of Indians from another; the second
was punitive, comprising the campaigns into Indian country
to recapture animals, rescue prisoners, or retaliate upon Indian rancherias to discourage future raids. 35 The success of
both methods was extremely limited as a result of inadequate
presidial and regular forces, the necessity of using untrained
and undisciplined Indian allies and militia, the employment
of poor leaders recruited from the local populace, extreme distaI).ces, supply problems, insufficient and outdated weapons,
and the wide dispersal of the population.
Spain reorganized the entire system for defense of her
northern frontier in 1776 when she created the Provincias
Internas del Norte under the leadership of a commandante
general. The Californias, Sinaloa, Sonora, Nueva Vizcaya,
Coahuila, Texas, and New Mexico comprised the original
Provincias Internas, but Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander
were subsequently added. 36 Teodoro de Croix, the first commandante general, and his military authorities immediately
turned their attention to resolving the crisis in the North.
Within the next decade New Mexico would pass through her
most critical period of occupation and defense against the
indios Mrbaros. By 1786 the province would no longer be
faced with possible annihilation or abandonment.
In view of the revolutionary activity and continued expansion of the North Americans, Croix considered the de33.
34.
35.
36.

Ibid., 27l.
Thomas, Teodoro de Croix, 24.
Ibid., 10-11.
Priestley, J 08e de Galvez, 293.
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fense of New Mexico to be of particular importance to the
security of New Spain's northern provinces. He also questioned the use of militia for he believed that such forces reduced the number of those paying tribute and increased the
taxes upon the natives, causing occasional riots. 37
Military authorities, such as Lt. Colonel Antonio Bonilla,
noted the presence of an abundant supply of manpower (both
Spaniards and Indians) to defend the province of New Mexico, but simultaneously emphasized that the lack of arms and
horses rendered the citizenry useless. 3s He again cited for
Spanish authorities the inability of obtaining assistance from
Zuni, Acoma, and Laguna, and concluded that hardly 250
Spaniards and an equal number of Indians were equipped
with horses and arms for the defense of the province,39
Bonilla pointed out that all the inhabitants had an obligation to assist in the general defense, but that at present
they were a "congregation of dissident, discordant, scattered
people without subordination, without horses, arms, knowledge of their handling, and were governed by their caprice."40 He proposed that formal militias be created with
experienced individuals in command and that remuneration
be provided, since the cost of each man on campaign could
exceed 150 pesos. 41 This revenue could be obtained, he suggested, from a levy upon local trade. 42
In spite of the extensive plans formulated in the first year
of the commandancy general, the indios Mrbaros, particularly the war-like Apache bands and Comanches, continued to
37. Ibid., 44.
38. Historic Points about New Mexico Written by Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio
Bonilla the Year of 1776, AGN, Historia 25, Document 7, paragraph 16. Bonilla's observations and recommendations may also be found in Alfred B. Thomas, "Antonio de Bonilla
and Spanish Plans for the Defense of New Mexico," New Spain and the Anglo-American
West, George P. Hammond (ed.) (2 vola.; Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Lancaster Press,
1932). I, 184-209.
39. Ibid., para. 17.
From Thomas' translation in his article cited above in note 38. The original may
be found in paragraph
of Bonilla's Historic Points. Bonilla also gave the population
figures for 1776 as 5,781 Spaniards, 12,999 Indians for a total of 18,780.
41. Bonilla, Historic Points, AGN, Historia 25, Document 7, para. 47.
42. Thomas "Antonio de Bonilla and Spanish Plans for the Defense of New Mexico,"
New Spain and the Anglo-American West, I, 186.

40.

44
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plunder the Spanish and Indian settlements. From June
through August, 1777, these two tribes killed sixty-one persons, captured eighteen and killed more than 1200 head of
stock.43 When in 1778 the Comanches swept over the province
and 127 persons were either killed or captured,44 Croix called
for a general military council to meet at Chihuahua. This
body adopted fifteen articles to establish a consistent, longterm Indian policy. These points included :45
1. An alliance of Spaniards with the Indians of the North against
the Apaches.
2. The conclusion that Apaches were unreliable and would not keep
either promises or peace treaties.
3. The belief that Comanches were in every way superior to
Apaches, and, therefore, their assistance must be obtained in
subduing the Apaches.
4. An observation that the average frontier presidio, consisting of
only fifty-six men, could not attend to all of its duties, such as
guarding horse herds, escorting supplies, carrying mail, and
other minor duties in addition to defending the area.
5. A conclusion that settlers had to be recruited to supplement the
presidials, but the simultaneous recognition that they had to pay
the costs themselves and that their absence on campaigns deprived their families of support while exposing their possessions
to raids by other Indians.

That same year a military officer, Lt. Colonel Juan Bautista de Anza, was appointed Governor of New Mexico.
Charged with the execution of the policy determined at Chihuahua, Anza reviewed presidials, militia and auxiliaries in
the EI Paso area before reaching Santa Fe in the latter part
of 1778. Soon after his arrival in the capital the new governor
established two definite lines of policy to meet the problem
of provincial defense. First, he campaigned against and negotiated with the frontier tribes to ward off their attacks and
secure their friendship. Second, he attempted to reorganize
Spanish settlements by collecting the scattered unprotected
43. Mendinueta to Croix. Santa Fe. 9 September 1777, quoted in Thomas. ibid.• 184.
44. General Report of 1781 by Teodoro de Croix. reproduced in Thomas, Teodoro de
Croi",.l11.
45. Thomas, The Plaim Indiam and New Me",ico, 53-55.
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families into towns similar to Indian pueblos which were
capable of defense against Apache, Comanche and Ute raids. 46
The governor's military campaigns were extensive and
gradually reduced the number of enemy tribes. Comanches
received the major portion of his attention and during his
term their raids became increasingly less frequent because of
tribal losses. By the end of 1778 they conducted only a few
minor raids in the vicinity of Abiquiu, Ojo Caliente and the
Chama River Valley. 47
Anza even decided to carry the war into the home country
of the hostile tribes. For these campaigns he adopted the
policy of his predecessors-employment of large numbers
of Pueblo Indian auxiliaries, later augmenting them with
other tribes which he had conquered or conciliated. In August and September, 1779, he led a military force of six hundred men 48 from San Juan de los Caballeros to locate and defeat the Comanche bands led by their principal chief Cuerno
Verde. The expedition included an auxiliary force of 259
Indians who served as scouts or spies (espias) for the army
as it moved northward. 49 The new governor outfitted settlers
and Indians alike, alloting each a good horse (although the
"best" were said to have two mounts), but their equipment
was limited and their munitions were in short supply, as reflected by the fact that each gun had only three charges of
powder. 50
Nevertheless, the expedition achieved two resounding victories over the Comanches, culminating in the death of
Cuerno Verde between present Pueblo and Walsenberg,
46. Thomas, Forgotten FTontier8, 374. This work remains the outstanding authority on
the administration and policies of Anza.
47. Croix to Anza, 8 January 1779, NMA, Document 714.
48. This figure has been established by close analysis of the document entitled Expedition of Anza and Death of Cuerno Verde, August and September, 1779, Letter of the
Governor to the Commandant Genera~ Santa Fe, 1 November 1779, AGN, Historia 25, f267288. The table included by Anza shows a total force of 645 men but there are two errors
in his addition. Thomas, FOTgotten FTontier8, 67, says that the number was 573, but no
basis for such a total can be located.
49. Expedition of Anza and Death of Cuerno Verde, August and September, 1779,
Letter of the Governor to the Commandant General, Santa Fe, 1 November 1779, AGN,
Historia 25, f270.
50. Thomas, Forgotten FTontierB, 67.
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Colorado. Having broken the Comanche resistance, Anza
turned his attention to other trouble spots. He always took
Pueblo auxiliaries with him on visits as well as campaigns.
Thus, on 10 September 1780 he led 126 men, including eightyeight Pueblo Indians (forty Tewas, forty Keres and eight
converted Moquis) to the Moqui (Hopi) villages of present
northeastern Arizona. 51 In his Apache campaign of November, 1780, in the South he took 151 men, of which thirty-four
were Indians,52 and his later Apache campaigns of 1785 involved forces of first, 120 horsemen, thirty foot soldiers, and
ninety-two Pueblos, and second, a combined operation of
Pueblos, Spaniards and Navahos against the Gila Apaches. 53
In these expeditions Anza assured his faithful Indian
allies of all spoils taken in battle except the horse herds.
There was, however, to be no pillaging until the action was
completed so that none of the enemy could escape. Looting
would be permitted by all after the conclusion of the engagement.54 In addition, a reward was offered for each hostile head which auxiliaries could acquire and one hundred
pesos was paid for each captive taken by the allied force. 55
Not only did the governor utilize his Pueblo Indian auxiliaries extensively on campaigns, but he tried to establish
Spanish towns along lines similiar to those of the pueblos
themselves. Each Spanish town had to have a minimum of
twenty families and the plazas therein would follow pueblo
construction, complete with bastions and gunports. His relocation of some groups and concentration of settlers met
with violent opposition and appeals to the commandante general,56 but Anza succeeded in improving the general defensive
position of the province.
By 1786 conditions had changed in New Mexico. Spain's
participation in the North American Revolutionary War as
51. Ibid., 228. Note that Thomas errs on page 27 when he concludes that there were
only forty-eight Indians.
52. Ibid.,
Again there is a discrepancy between this figure and the one of thirty-six
used on page 37.
53. Ibid., 47.
54. Ibid., 253.
55. Croix to Anza, Arizpe,
October 1780, NMA, Document 809.
56. Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers, 379.
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an ally of France had ended, new weapons had reached the
northern frontier, peace had finally been established with the
Comanches, the size of the presidial force at Santa Fe had
grown from eighty to 119 and the population of the province
reached 20,810. 57 It was now possible to concentrate the defensive effort against the Apaches for Anza had succeeded
in adding new allies-Comanches, Utes, Navahos and Jicarilla Apaches-to his already closely-established alliance with
the Pueblos. Now there were six nations against one highlydisunified enemy.
The new viceroy, Bernardo de Galvez, promulgated extensive instructions regarding future Indian policy. He desired
"swift and vigorous war with the Indians who declared it,
peace with those who solicited it, and an attempt to win allies
among the warlike nations by spreading the use of Spanish
foods, drinks, weapons, and customs among them."58 He
urged extensive use of the Indian auxiliary in Sonora, Nueva
Vizcaya and New Mexico,59 and concluded that troops must
operate in those areas with the aid of Spanish settlers and
Indians of the pueblos. 60
Pueblo Indians were utilized in conjunction with other Indian allies for a, unified campaign against the Gila Apaches
in the region of present western New Mexico and eastern
Arizona. Navahos joined with Pueblos, Spanish troops and
settlers for this expedition, according to the instructions of
the new commandante general Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola. 61
Anza was directed to purchase supplies for all the allies and
he was to send gifts, such as scarlet cloth and medals, to the
57. General Report of Teodoro de Croix in Thomas, Teodoro de Croix, 105-106. Although these figures are for 1781, they present a fair estimate of the size of the presidio
and population five years later.
Bernardo de Gavez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces of New
Spain, 1786, Donald E. Worcester (ed.) (Berkeley: The Quivira Society, 1951),23. There
are some unique recommendations. such as furnishing firearms and livestock to hostile
Indians, in these instructions. Had Galvez lived longer to implement his policies, it is
obvious that there would have been vast changes in Indian administration on the northern
frontier.
59. Ibid., 69.
60. Ibid., 72.
61. Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers, 54.
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Navahos. Horses and mules were sent to New Mexico, but it
was made clear that they were for the Indian auxiliaries only
while on campaign. They were not to be used by the soldiers
of the regular military force. 62
For the Gilefio campaigns Pueblos comprised a large part
of the total Spanish force. The expedition of 1786 involved
a total of '235 men, including sixty Pueblo Indians, twentytwo Comanches and twenty-six Navahos.63 In the following
year a highly-organized campaign of 340 men, including
ninety-nine Pueblos, was dispatched against the same Gila
Apaches. The force had the following basic marching and
fighting organization: 64
1st Division
Troop of Santa Fe (mounted)
Pueblo of Acoma (foot)
Comanches (mounted)
Settler from Sandia (mounted)
Jicarilla Apaches (mounted)

22
24
30
4

5

--s5
2nd Division
Troop of Nueva Vizcaya (mounted)
Settlers from Albuquerque (mounted)
Settlers from Santo Domingo (mounted)
Pueblo of Laguna (one mounted, others foot)
Pueblo of Acoma (foot)
Settlers from Sandia (mounted)
8rd Division
Troop of Nueva Vizcaya (mounted)
Settlers from La Canada (mounted)
Settlers from Santa Fe (mounted)
Settlers from Santo Domingo (mounted)
Pueblo of Zuni (foot)

21
22
20
6

12
4
85

23
14
21
3

25

-s6
62. Ibid., 48 and 269.
63. Letter of the Commandant General Giving Notice of Peace Concluded with the
Comanche Nation and Its Reconciliation with the Ute, July, 1786, AGN, Provincias Internas
65, Expediente 2, paragraph 46.
64. Diary of the Campaign that Left the Villa of Santa Fe, New Mexico under the
Orders of Commandant Inspector [8ic] Don Antonio Rengel, Today, 21 October 1787, AGN,
Provincias Internas 128, Expediente 2.
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4th Division
Troop of Santa Fe (mounted)
Settlers from La Canada (mounted)
Settlers from Santo Domingo (mounted)
Pueblo of Laguna (foot)
Pueblo of Zuni (foot)

13
25
13
28
5

-s4
From this organizational plan it may be noted that each
division was a separate "army" in itself, complete with experienced regular troops and leaders, settlers and Indian
auxiliaries. Pueblo Indians, principally from the western
pueblos of Zuni, Acoma and Laguna, still comprised the
major portion of the Indian auxiliaries, but they continued to
be afoot in spite of the horses provided for their use.
Money payments were to be rendered to the friendly tribes
as a reward for their military assistance,65 and some six
thousand pesos were sent, along with horses and carbines, for
use on these expeditions. 66 The agility and physical stamina
of the Pueblos was noted in 1788 by the new governor, Fernando de la Concha, who admired the obedience of the Indians to his campaign summons. 67
By this time there were 2,647 soldiers and officers in Santa
Fe, Santa Cruz de la Canada, Keres, Alameda, Albuquerque, .
and Taos, in addition to the Indian auxiliaries organized
jurisdictionally as follows :68
Recognizing the importance of Indian allies, commandante
general Ugarte advised Governor Fernando de la Concha to
save the lives of his Apache prisoners so that they could be
converted to the Spanish way of life and thus continue to
reduce the number of enemies in the region. 69
65. Fernando de la Concha, Bando, Santa Fe [undated, but presumably in 1788], NMA,
Document 1025.
66. State Which Depicts the Number of Settlers and Indians Which This Province Has
Capable of Taking-up Arms, Santa Fe, 20 June 1788, AGN, Provincias Internae 65,
Expediente 7.
67. General Report of the Governor of New Mexico about the State of That Province,
Year of 1788, AGN, Provincias Internae 254.
68. State Which Depicts the Number of Settlers and Indians Which This Province Has
Capable of Taking-up Arms, Santa Fe, 20 June 1788, AGN, Provincias Internae 65,
Expediente 7.
69. Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola to Fernando de la Concha, 23 January 1788, NMA, Document 998.
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Santa Fe
La Canada
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Pueblos of Indians
Tesuque
Abiquiu
San Juan
Santa Clara
San Ildefonso
Pojoaque
Nambe
Picuris
Keres
San Felipe
Santo Domingo
Cochiti
Santa Ana
Zia
Jemez
Alameda
Sandia
Albuquerque Isleta
Taos
Taos
Laguna
Laguna
Acoma
Zuni
Zuni
Pecos
Pecos
9 Jurisdictions 21 Pueblos

Capts.

Lts.

Pvts.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

50
54
47
62
85
26
40
55
105
140
160
115
120
118
94
90
118
204
240
294
95

21

21

2,312

1

No.
52
56
49
64
87
28
42
57
107
142
162
117
122
120
96
92
120
206
242
296
97
2,354

New concepts, particularly pertinent to Indian auxiliaries,
dominated the period after 1788. Pueblos often are mentioned
only incidentally on military campaigns and sometimes it
appears that they did not participate at all. Increasing use of
Comanches, converted Apaches, Navahos and Utes seems apparent. However, numerous Pueblo Indians were included on
special campaigns, such as those conducted against the Natagee Apaches in 1790,70 and on retaliatory expeditions against
raiding hostiles.
New Mexico had reached a state of relative tranquillity
when compared to its position during the previous two decades. The quantity of mules and cattle increased markedly
70. Instructions to 2d Alferez Pablo Sandoval for tbe Conduct of the Campaign against
the Apaches, Santa Fe, 14 July 1790, NMA, Document 1087. Other documents also reflect
the absence of Pueblo allies. See, for example, Concha to Nava, 1 November 1791, NMA,
Document 1164(3) and Concha to Viceroy Revilla Gigedo, 6 May 1793. NMA, Document
1234.
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and horses were in plentiful supply by 1791,71 Probably the
greatest problem by the last decade of the eighteenth century
was maintaining unity among the auxiliaries since there
were long-standing hatreds of one for the other. The antipathy between the utes and Comanches is an outstanding
example of this disunity.
Both offensive and retaliatory campaigns continued
against various Apache bands. Raiding Natagees in the
vicinity of Tome and Belen were pursued by fourteen Indians,
mounted bareback, from Isleta Pueblo during June, 1791,72
and Gila Apaches were pursued in a more extensive western
campaign during 1793. In this latter expedition forty Indians
from Acoma and Laguna, led by the alcalde mayor of Acoma,
caught up with the fleeing hostiles after a chase of some
twenty-five miles, but they were ambushed when a band of
twenty-two Apaches attacked from behind, killing three
Pueblos and putting the rest to flight. 73 To punish the victorious Gileiios the governor personally led a large military
expedition composed of most of the troops of the Santa Fe
Presidio, militia forces, and Indian auxiliaries; as well as
scouts, from the pueblos of Laguna, Taos and Jemez. 74 Heavy
snow and inability to locate any major groups of Apaches
rendered the campaign generally unsuccessful.
In his summary of his term of office for his successor FernandoChacon, Governor Fernando de la Concha provided a
complete analysis of the Indian situation in 1794. He cited
the alliance and friendship of the intrepid Comanches, the
Utes, the Jicarilla Apaches, and the Navahos since their close
relations with the Gila Apaches had been severed in 1788.
Then he emphasized the need for continued warfare against
71. Fernando de la Concha to the Commandant General of the Provincias Intemas del
Oriente Pedro de Nava, Santa Fe, 1 November 1791, NMA, Document 1164(3).
72. Fernando de la Concha to Conde de Revilla Gigedo, Santa Fe, 1 July 1791, NMA,
Document 1129.
73. Fernando de la Concha to the Commandant General Pedro de Nava of the Provincias Internas del Oriente, Santa Fe, 30 April 1793, NMA, Document 1231.
74. Ibid. Although the governor states that the last-named were "Tiguas," it is probable
that he meant Jemez Indians. He refers to that pueblo as an ally in this campaign during
the course of his letter of 19 November 1793 to Pedro de Nava. See NMA, Document 1266
for this correspondence.
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the one enemy, Apaches - variously known as Faraones,
Mimbrefios, Natagees and Gilefios. 75 After outlining the need
and provisions for maintaining interpreters, citing some of
the Indian hatreds and friendships, and examining the practice of giving the visiting heathen tribes presents of clothing,
hats, mirrors, knives, cigars, oranges, and indigo before they
left Santa Fe,76 the outgoing governor turned to the defense
of the province.
In this analysis Fernando de la Concha reviewed Anza's
organization of militia companies under alcaldes mayores
and lieutenants. He stated that both settlers and Indians
should be considered for campaigns, designating the former
by name and title and the latter only by number. 77 Apparently he had become disillusioned with the role played by the
settlers for he warned Chacon not to give them anything other
than munitions, pointing out that in addition they would
always ask for horses and provisions. 78
Contrary to his impressions regarding the settlers, those
concerning the Pueblo Indians were of praise for their exemplary characters. He noted that they never would ask for
anything except the munitions to which they were entitled,79
that they were truthful and obedient, and that they were not
guilty of stealing. 80 He further pointed out that the six Keres
pueblos should not be counted in the total available for service
with the auxiliaries since they maintained their own detachment to counter the entrance of Apaches into the realm.
From the remaining total of Indians, however, the new governor should count on each for fifteen days of service every
two years, whereas from the settlers fifteen days of service
were required every six years. 81
75. Instruction Formed by Colonel Don Fernando de la Concha, Past Governor of the
Province of New Mexico, In Order That His Successor Lieutenant Colonel Don Fernando
de Chacon May Adapt from It Whatever May Seem Convenient for the Good Tranquillity
and Growth of the Same Province, Chihuahua, 28 June 1794, AGN, Historia 41, Document
10, para. 3-8.
76. Ibid., para. 9 and 10.
77. Ibid., para. 13 and 14.
78. Ibid., para.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., para. 23.
81. Ibid.
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For the next decade the province enjoyed a settled state of
affairs among the Spaniards, Pueblos, Navahos, Utes, Jicarilla Apaches and Comanches. 82 However, there were problems with the Pawnees and, as always, with the Apaches.
There were infrequent general campaigns during the period,
but military action seems to have been limited largely to
retaliatory expeditions at irregular intervals. Some reluctance on the part of both settlers and Indians to participate
in the campaigns may also be observed. 83 Indian companies
were formed, and apparently Pueblo Indian auxiliaries were
still much in demand, for the Commandant of Troops in the
EI Paso area requested that Taos Indians be sent to aid him
in his campaign of 1800 against the southern Apaches. 84
During the early part of the nineteenth century Apache raids
struck largely at horse herds and cattle. In 1801, for example,
Alameda, Santa Cruz de la Canada, Taos, Pecos, and the Rio
Arriba country all felt their impact. 85
Far more important, however, were the renewed hostilities with the Navajos after 1804. To combat the threat
created by their rebellious bands in the western portion of
the province, Governor Chacon dispatched a campaign force
of more than three hundred men, commanded by Lieutenant
Antonio Narbona. Arriving at Zuni Pueblo on 21 November
1804, the commander of the expedition split his troops into
two groups to pursue the warring bands of Navahos. These
two groups included Pueblo Indians as auxiliaries. They
came from Laguna, Acoma and Isleta,86 totaling approximately one hundred plus two scouts from Zuni. 87 Lieutenant
Nicolas Farin of Laguna commanded the second group while
Narbona took charge of the other in a campaign hindered by
82. Pedro de Nava to Governor Chac6n, Chihuahua, 31 December 1794, NMA, Document 1303a.
83. Pedro de Nava to Governor Cbac6n, Chihuahua, 29 August 1799, NMA, Document
146l.
84. Joseph Manuel Ochoa, Commandant of Troops in the El Paso Area, to Governor
Chac6n, 30 November 1800, NMA, Document 1519.
85. Diary of Governor Chac6n, Santa Fe, 31 August 1801, NMA, Document 1565.
86. Chac6n to Lieutenant Nicolas Farin, Santa Fe, 20 November 1804, NMA, Document 1774.
87. Ibid.

102

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

heavy snows. Little success was attained by the expedition,
and Navaho disturbances continued intermittently for the
next three years.
The status of Pueblo Indians as auxiliaries in the Spanish
army had undergone considerable change during the past
four decades. No longer were they denied horses or firearms
as had been their experience in the year 1762-1763 when
Spain secured Louisiana from France, thus causing great
changes in basic Spanish Indian policy. Muster roles of the
New Mexico militia in 1806 revealed that Pueblo Indians,
although listed separately, still comprised an important part
of that force. Thus, there were 199 Pueblo Indians at the four
pueblos of Sandia, Cochiti, San Felipe and Santo Domingo,
for example, who were mounted and armed. There were more
than three hundred Pueblos at these same four locations who
were dismounted and armed, and the four towns reflected
the possession of seventy-six firearms. 88
By 1808 there were three companies of militia, consisting
of sixty-one men each, enlisted to aid the regular troops. They
received no pay for their services and usually had to furnish
their own uniforms, provisions and most of their equipment. 89
The Indian auxiliaries did likewise in their campaigns against
hostile Apaches and occasionally rebellious Navahos. Furthermore, they were employed in scouting expeditions against
real and suspected encroachments by North Americans. 9o
88. Muster Rolls of New Mexico, San Carlos de Alameda, 19 July 1806, NMA, Document 1995.
89. Hubert H. Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico (San Francisco: The History Como.
pany, 1889), Volume XVII of thirty-nine volumes The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft,
305. Although the author used Pino's Exposici6n (see note 93) as his source on the miiltia
at this time, there is some discrepancy in his figures for that source says there were three
companies of sixty~nine men each.
90. Governor Real Alencaster to Lieutenant Nicolas de Almanza and Lieutenant Ignacio Sotelo, Instructions, Santa Fe, 18 April 1807, NMA, Document 2049, describes the
dispatch of a military and Indian expedition to observe the known passes of the Sangre
de Cristo Mountains. Interim Governor Alberto Maynez later issued instructions to the
Commandant of the Taos Detachment for two scouting forces to depart every eight days,
one to the Rio de las Animas (perhaps the Purgatoire River of Southern Colorado since
its lengthy name was the Rio de las Animas Perdidas en Purgatorio) and the other to the
Rio Arriba del Norte (undoubtedly the Upper Rio Grande). The purpose of both of these
reconnaissance expeditions was to report suspected North American encroachments.
Pueblo Indians participated in these ventures. Each member was supplied with two horses
and a mule. See Maynez, Instructions, Santa Fe, 20 June 1808, NMA, Document 2122.
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For their role as loyal allies, Pueblos and other tribes were
rewarded with gifts of commercial articles and clothing. The
interim governor of New Mexico was advised to use all possible means to acquire and maintain their friendship, but
particularly he was to offer gifts and trade articles which
they especially appreciated. 91 It is apparent that Indian auxiliaries were also rewarded with food when on campaigns, because cattle were slaughtered to provide them meat. 92 The
policy of giving presents, which had been initiated by .1\.nza
in 1786, was continued for all tribes. These gifts included
coats and blue capes with red lapels for the chiefs, three-cornered hats, medals, food and wine. 93
A detailed study of New Mexico's defense was made in
1812 by Pedro Bautista Pino. He reviewed the continuous
state of war experienced by the province since its settlement,
concluding that in spite of being surrounded by thirty-three
nations of "gentiles" (hostile or non-Christian Indians), the
Spaniards had not lost one handful of land from New Mexico's original boundaries. 94
To retain the territory, however, it was necessary to have
1,500 men under arms,95 consisting of a "veteran company"
(Presidio of Santa Fe), militia and auxiliaries. The "veteran
company" was composed of 121 troops, of which thirty always guarded the horse herd, fifteen were on guard duty in
the capital, seven were at Sevilleta to watch the Apache frontier, and the scattered remainder were supported at the expense of the settlers. 96 To augment these inadequate forces,
militia troops in three companies, each commanded by a captain,97 were recruited from the citizenry since each person
91. Commandant General Nemesio Salcedo to Interim Governor Joseph Manrrique,
Chihuahua, 14 May 1810, NMA, Document 2321.
92. Bill of Sergeant Jose Alaxi, 7 March 1810, NMA, Document 2296.
93. Don Pedro Bautista Pino, Exposici6n Sucinta y Sencilla de la Provincia del Nuevo
Mexico (Cadiz: Imprenta del Estado Mayor General, 1812), found in AGI, Guadalajara
This printed document is included within the cited tomo itself. In addition, there is a
translation of it in H. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard (trans.), Three New Mexico
Chronicles (Albuquerque: The Quivira Society, 1942).
94. Ibid., 14.
95. Ibid., 15.
96. Ibid., 16.
97. Ibid., 19-20.
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(including Indians) was obligated to present himself for an
annual tour of duty. Serving without pay, each had to bring
his own horses, shotguns, pistols, bows and arrows, and provisions for a forty-five-day tour which sometimes was extended to reach a total of two or three months. 98
Since the province now contained more than 24,000 Spanish settlers and about 16,000 Indians,99 the depredations of
hostile Indian groups were not so widely felt as in the previous
century. Yet, campaigns continued and Pueblo contingents
played a major part in their success. Sporadic disturbances
by Faraon, Mescalero and Gila Apaches, plus marauding
bands of Navajos, led to Pueblo retaliatory actions and requests of other Indian tribes, such as the Utes, for assistance
of the Pueblos against the "Naciones del Norte." 100 Success
must have been achieved occasionally for one authority noted
that the Pueblo of San Juan had on display the heads of three
Apaches taken in 1810,1°1
General campaigns during the period 1810-1821 were not
only conducted against rebellious Apache and Navajo bands,
but for reconnaissance purposes against reported United
States' encroachments. For an unstated purpose, but one
which was probably to investigate the reported presence of
North Americans, in 1817, one circular sent by the interim
governor of New Mexico clearly reveals the manner in which
campaign forces were recruited and collected. This circular
served as an official order to the alcaldes of Cochiti, Alameda,
Albuquerque, Belen, Santo Domingo, Laguna, Zuni, Santa
Cruz de la Canada, Abiquiu,. Taos, Vado, Jemez and EI
Paso. 102 It stated the rendezvous points for an expedition of
fifty days and ordered all who reported to assembly points to
98. Ibid., 15.
99. Ibid., 47.
100. Circular of Joseph Manrrique to Alcaldes Mayores, Santa Fe, 5 October 1812,
NMA, Document 2459.
101. Manrrique to Salcedo, Santa Fe, 16 July 1810, NMA, Document 2339.
102. Circular of Interim Governor Pedro Maria Allande to tbe Alcaldes of This Province
and Those of the Governor of EI Paso, Year of 1817, NMA, Document 2686. This campaign
was probably to locate a large party of North Americans which friendly Apaches had reported seeing. Reference NMA, Document 2714.

PUEBLO INDIAN AUXILIARIES

105

do so "equipped and armed."103 Each alcalde was ordered to
select a certain designated number of men in his jurisdiction
and dispatch them to the appointed rendezvous, being certain
that they arrived on the specified date. Here an appointed
officer, either from the Presidio or the militia, would take
charge of the unified force for the ensuing campaign.l°4
Indian auxiliaries, of course, were obtained in this manner, as may be noted from a close scrutiny of the addressees in
the above circular. Another expedition in the following year,
led by Second Lieutenant Jose Maria de Arce, to search for
"foreigners" encroaching upon Comanche country, involved
120 settlers and Indians of the Pueblo of Taos. Included were
twenty-nine mounted Indians and twenty-three on foot,
armed with thirty-three guns, thirty-nine lances and numerous bows and arrows. 105
Navajo hostilities again occupied the majority of Spain's
defensive forces in New Mexico from 1818 to 1821. Pueblo
Indian auxiliaries, now organized into companies of both
cavalry and infantry as at Cochiti, for example,106 were employed during the uprising. After raids of isolated Navajo
groups in midsummer, 1818, the Spaniards collected extensive campaign forces, including Indian allies, at Jemez and
Zuni pueblos. Campaign contributions of the pueblos included
more than just troops, for food 107 and livestock, such as bulls,
cows and oxen, were furnished from both pueblos and Spanish settlements. 108
Jemez contributed greatly to these Navajo campaigns.
Alcalde Ignacio Maria Sanchez Vergara maintained constant
direct communication with the governor, advising him of ex103. Ibid.
104. Numbers of persons, commanders, designated rendezvous points and dates estab-

lished may be examined for the 1817 campaign in the document cited in f.n. 102.
105. Alfred B. Thomas, "Documents Bearing upon the Northern Frontier of New
Mexico, 1818-1819," (Santa Fe, 1929). This is a reprint of the author's earlier article iu
the NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW.
106. Company of Cavalry and Infantry, Alcaldia of Cochiti, 5 November 1819, NMA,
Document 2857.
107. See the Returns of Socorro, Sevilleta, Belen, Tome, Jemez, Taos, etc., 18 Septeln-

ber-16 November 1818, NMA, Document 2747.
108. See the Returns of the Alcaldias of Belen, Albuquerque, Alameda, Cochiti, Jemez,
etc., 5-22 May 1819, NMA, Document 2812.
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109. Sanchez Vergara to Governor AIlande, Jemez, 29 June 1818, NMA, Document 2728.
110. General State Manifested of the Number of Men United in This Pueblo of Jemez
to Operate on the Expedition to Navajo under the Command of Captain Antonio Cabeza
de Vaca, NMA, Document 2994.
111. Facundo Melgaresto the Ayuntamiento of Santa Fe, 27 August 1821, NMA, Document, 3019.
112. Reeve, "Navaho-Spanish Diplomacy, 1770-1790," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW,
XXXV, No.3 (July, 1960), 210.
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on behalf of the Spaniards against the common foe. Third,
auxiliary forces were always an integral part of the Spanish
armies, and as such were acquiring provisions, horses and
firearms, three of the basic goals of the hostile tribes, with
out endangering continued tribal existence.
Most important, however, was the precedent set by the
Pueblo Indian auxiliaries. Their use, particularly during the
period described when Spain was endeavoring to defend her
tremendous territorial expanse in the largely uninhabited
north, set the standard for the future recruitment of all New
Mexico auxiliaries. Spanish authorities gradually improved
recruiting, equipping, organization, tactical employment and
maintenance of Pueblo auxiliaries during the eighteenth century. Mistakes undoubtedly were made, but Spain profited
from them in dealing with future friendly Indian tribes. During the crucial period from 1770 to 1786 New Mexico largely
solved her problem of defense against hostile tribes, assuring
her continued occupation of the region until Mexican independence was achieved.
The cultural and social ties between Spaniards and Pueblo
Indians were greatly strengthened by the use of auxiliaries
on campaigns. Both groups, serving in close association on
repeated expeditions, established a military bond of friendship. This alliance, therefore, contributed to the interchange
of ideas, customs, language and military traditions, further
linking the two allies and establishing the mixed civilization
which may be observed to this day.
Spain came to rely heavily upon the aid of her auxiliary
forces, which swelled to overwhelming odds when six strong
allies appeared to oppose one foe by 1788. Campaign forces
always reflected this reliance for auxiliaries usually comprised one-third to one-half (sometimes more) of the total
expeditionary force. Certainly Pueblo Indians were the most
dependable portion of the New Mexico militia. But were they
really members of that militia? Campaign levies and organizational plans, returns of New Mexico jurisdictions, and muster rolls indicate that Indians were always reflected and
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treated separately. Yet, although they were listed apart from
other militia members, they were included on these rolls.
Therefore, it is apparent that Pueblos and other auxiliaries
were considered as being members of the militia for administrative purposes, but for operational ones they were completely independent of the regular organization, having their
own cacique or alcalde, who reported directly to the commander of the expedition.
The use of Pueblo Indians as auxiliaries for the inadequate Spanish regular army on the New Mexico frontier was
only a link in three centuries of the Spanish chain of defense
which relied upon Indian auxiliaries everywhere. However,
this was a most important link for it enabled Spain to preserve
her occupation of New Mexico after Onate's settlement from
1598to 1605. Gradually Spain overcame the serious menace of
the indios Mrbaros in the latter half of the eighteenth century. By 1821 the isolationism of the province, caused by the
earlier complete encirclement of the settled region by hostile
tribes, had been overcome.
Once comparative tranquillity had been established, New
Mexico's continued occupation and growth were no longer
jeopardized. The Pueblo Indians played a significant role in
the achievement of this objective. Without their military aid
and extreme loyalty Spain could not have achieved the pacification of her nothern frontier. Just as Cortes had recognized
the importance of Tlascalan auxiliaries in the reduction of
the Aztecs three centuries earlier, Spain had largely completed the "conquest" of New Mexico by 1821, using the same
technique.
The adaptability of Pueblo Indians to warfare against
hostile forces did not end with the Spanish withdrawal from
the North American Continent. Both Mexico and the United
States, each in its turn, recognized the loyalty, military use-fulness and intertribal hatreds of the Pueblos. During the
remainder of the nineteenth century these two countries employed Pueblo auxiliary forces, particularly on campaigns
against Apaches. The precedent set by Spain was adopted
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by others who discovered the necessity of augmenting inadequate military forces. Perhaps, more than any other factor,
Pueblo Indian auxiliaries served their homeland to achieve its
pacification and ultimate stability.

